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Introduction

In 1993 Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act,
which placed a limitation on state power to regulate rates of wireless
carriers. This legislation explicitly reserved to the states the power to
adjust the "terms and conditions" of a wireless provider's service. The
FCC, however, interpreted the act as preempting states from requiring or
prohibiting explicit line items. While many of the theoretical grounds for
the FCC's 2005 Truth-in-Billing Declaratory Ruling ("2005 TIB
DeclaratoryRuling" or "Ruling")' are correct, the empirical examples cited
seem to conflict with its theoretical rulings, causing some of the Ruling to
violate 5 U.S.C. § 706.2 Moreover, the two courts that have dealt with the
Ruling both defined "rates" unambiguously. This could lead the 2005 TIB
Declaratory Ruling to be declared by courts as over-inclusive under the3
first step of the Chevron U.S.A. v. NaturalResources Defense Council test.
This article argues that the FCC has the statutory authority to preempt
line-item charges, but not line-item descriptions. For the purposes of this
article, line-item charges are discrete charges, whereas line-item
descriptions describe those charges. The difference is based on the aim of
the state regulation. If the line-item regulation affects the bottom line
charged the customer, the state regulation could be considered a regulation
of a line-item charge. If, however, the bottom line is unaffected, then the
state regulation does nothing more than affect the charge's description and
should not be considered a regulation of a line-item charge. For instance, if
a state regulation did not allow commercial mobile radio services
("CMRS" or "wireless/cellular carriers/providers") to charge for fiveminute calls to L.A., then it would affect the overall amount that a carrier
could charge a customer. However, a line-item description merely
describes these charges. Prohibiting or requiring a line-item description
does not affect the overall amount of the charge because an agency can
simply re-label the charge as something else. Regulations of line-item
descriptions could be considered by courts to be within states' and outside
the FCC's statutory authority under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
Section II of this note assesses the 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling and
its subsequent interpretations by courts. Section III argues that the Ruling
could be deemed by courts to be arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. §
706 because its reasoning is internally inconsistent and over inclusive.
This Section also argues that the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling may
ultimately be remanded by a circuit court because it violates the first step of
1.
2.
3.

Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6448 (2005).
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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the Chevron test. Finally, Section IV addresses the FCC's use of precedent
to alter the definition of "rates." Part V concludes the paper.
II. Evolution of the Declaratory Ruling Through Legislation,
the Commission, and the Courts
Federal preemption of CMRS line-item billing started with legislation.
In the early 1990s, cellular telephone was not yet a distinctive legal
classification. Congress sought to rectify this omission with the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("1993 Omnibus Act").4 In response to
the legislation, the FCC adopted multiple orders, the latest and most
pertinent coming in 2005. The 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling declared that
regulations of line items on a consumer's bill were regulations of "rate
elements" and, thus, were "rates," preempted under 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(3)(A). Two courts have directly addressed this aspect of the 2005
TIB DeclaratoryRuling. One of these courts, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, struck down the provision. A Washington district court, however,
found the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning unpersuasive and affirmed the
FCC's Ruling.
A.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993

The 1993 Omnibus Act was the first act to form the regulatory regime
for commercial cellular telephone services.5 One of the 1993 Omnibus
Act's provisions, codified in 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), states in relevant
part,
[N]o State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the
entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any
private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a
State from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial
mobile services.
This section denies states the ability to interfere with the "rates" charged by
wireless telephone services, but preserves the states' ability to regulate
"other terms and conditions" of that service. The section's legislative
history does not reveal Congress' intended meaning of "rates." 6 Congress'
inattention to this key word may indicate that it felt that the word's
meaning was unambiguous. Congress' silence, however, is not evidence
4. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 60002(b)(2)(A),
107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified in relevant part in 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000)); see also Nat'l
Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006).
5. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act § 6001 et seq.; see also Nat'l Ass'n of State
Util. Consumer Advocates, 457 F.3d at 1242.
6. Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Reg. at 6462, n.79 (citing Cellular
Telecomms. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
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that the statute's meaning is unambiguous. The House did provide insight
into the definition of "other terms and conditions." A House Report from
the 1993 Omnibus Act suggests that the House believed "customer 7billing
information and practices" constituted "other terms and conditions.,

B.
1.

FCC's 2005 Truth-in-BillingDeclaratoryRuling
Precursorto the Ruling

Although the language at issue originated from the 1993 Omnibus
Act, the deregulation resulting from the 1996 Telecommunications Act 8 led
telecommunications companies to engage in cramming 9 and slamming' °
practices. In response, the FCC issued the Truth-in-Billing Order and
Further Notice ("1999 TIB Order") to help consumers better understand
their bills by establishing billing rules. I"
The 1999 TIB Order required:
First, that consumer telephone bills be clearly organized, clearly identify
the service provider, and highlight any new providers; Second, that bills
contain full and non-misleading descriptions of charges that appear
therein; and, Third, that bills contain clear and conspicuous disclosure of
7. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 261, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. 378, 588). Moreover, a
finding was added to the bill and then later removed, which seemed to indicate why Congress felt
wireless regulation should be distinct. Finding 13 of the 1993 Omnibus Act, at one point stated,
[B]ecause commercial mobile services require a Federal license and the Federal
Government is attempting to promote competition for such services, and because
providers of such services do not exercise market power vis-a-vis telephone exchange
service carriers and State regulation can be a barrier to the development of competition
in this market, uniform national policy is necessary and in the public interest.
See 139 Cong. Rec. S7765-02 (Amend. No. 506, § 4002(13)).
Although this finding, as well as all of the 1993 Omnibus Act's findings, was later stricken,
the national nature of wireless services was very likely the ultimate consideration of Congress
when creating section 332. After all, the natural, boundary-less nature of radio waves is the most
obvious justification for treating wireless different than wireline. The FCC considered the
national nature of wireless services relevant to its definition of "rates." See Truth-In-Billing and
Billing Format, 20 FCC Reg. at 6463-64. But see Reply Brief for Petitioner, Nat'l Ass'n of State
Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 2006 WL 2363538, § I(B) (11 th Cir. 2006) (arguing that the
FCC was arbitrary and capricious for considering national and regional pricing since this was not
a part of the legislative history).
8. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 1, et seq., 110 Stat. 56
(codified in various sections of 47 U.S.C.); see Truth-in-Billing and Billing Format, 14 FCC Reg.
7492, 7494-95 (1999).
9. Cramming occurs when additional services are added to customers' phone plans without
their permission. Id. at 7494 n.4.
10. Slamming occurs when long distance carriers switch users to their own network without
their users' permission. Id.
11. Id. at 4793-94.
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any information the consumer
may need to make inquiries about, or
12
contest charges, on the bill.
The FCC implemented minimal guidelines to help telecommunications
13
providers meet the newly established consumer protection rules.
The 1999 TIB Order, however, made an exemption for CMRS
providers. Because wireless services were, inter alia, not receiving the
same number of complaints as wireline providers, the FCC did not mandate
the same billing requirements for wireless telephone providers. 14 The FCC
did apply two rules to CMRS billing, however, because it considered these
rules to be fundamental to all telecommunications providers' consumer
bills: "(1) that the name of the service provider associated with each charge
be clearly identified on the bill; and (2) that each bill should prominently
display a telephone number that customers may call free-of-charge
in order
15
to inquire about or dispute any charge contained on the bill."'
In 2004 the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates
("NASUCA") petitioned the FCC for a declaratory ruling.1 6 NASUCA
contended that the 1999 TIB Order was being violated by both wireline and
CMRS providers. 17 Specifically, the petition alleged that wireline and
wireless carriers created line-item charges that they claimed covered
government-mandated costs, but which were really just recovering
operating costs.18 NASUCA argued that these line-item descriptors were
misleading, even deceptive,' 9 and that the situation necessitated the FCC to
issue a declaratory ruling consistent with the 1999 TIB Order.2" NASUCA
claimed that the declaratory ruling should prohibit carriers from imposing
line items unless the charges were "expressly mandated by federal, state or
local regulatory action."'
Less than a year after NASUCA filed its
petition, the FCC rendered its declaratory ruling.
2.

The 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling

In the Truth-in-BillingSecond Report and Order, DeclaratoryRuling,
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("2005 TIB

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.at 4796.
Id. at 4798-99.
Id. at 7501-02.
Id. at 7502.
See generally Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Reg. 6448 (2005).
Id. at 6564.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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DeclaratoryRuling"),22 the FCC responded to the NASUCA petition. The
FCC made five declarations aimed at ensuring that wireless and wireline
billing practices were not misleading. 3 The most pertinent ruling states
that "state regulations requiring or prohibiting the use of line items for
CMRS constitute rate regulation and are preempted under section
332(c)(3)(A). 24 This ruling thereby vests all regulatory authority over line
items with the FCC, preempting any regulation from the states.
The Commission defines a line item broadly as "a discrete charge
identified separately on an end user's bill. 25 With a few exceptions, the
FCC prohibits state regulation that requires or prohibits line items. These
particular charges, when added up, constitute the overall rate that is
charged a customer. For example, a state regulation that prohibits a
customer's billed phone calls from being rounded up to whole minute
increments, would be preempted by the FCC for directly interfering with
the rate structure of the CMRS carrier.26
Because Congress did not define the term "rate" in the 1993 Omnibus
Act, the FCC defined a "rate" as an "amount of payment or charge based
on some other amount" in its Southwestern Bell Order.27 The Commission,
however, did not restate its definition in the 2005 TIB Declaratory
Ruling.28 Instead, the Commission argued that "rates" should be defined
that "no State ...shall have
broadly because the 1993 Omnibus Act states
29
any authority to regulate ... rates charged.9

In the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling, the FCC used the USF
Contribution Order" as evidence that line items are "rates." According to
the FCC's logic, line items are rate elements; rate elements are rate
structures; rate structures comprise rates; rates are preempted from state
regulation; therefore, by force of reason, line items are preempted from
state regulation. 3 1 Rather than reiterate its Southwestern Bell Order
definition of a "rate," the FCC drew on its prior uses of the terms "rate
levels" and "rate structures" to define "rates.", 32 "Rates" consist of "rate
levels" and "rate structures." "Rate levels" are the prices providers charge

22.
23.
24.
25.
26
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See generally id.
See id. at 6449.
Id.
Id. at 6462.
See Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rec. 19,898, 19,906-07 (1999).
Id. at 19,907.
See generally Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6448.
See id. at 6462-63 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A)) (emphasis supplied by the FCC).
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 FCC Rec. 24,952 (2002).
See Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. at 6463-64.
See Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rec. 19,898, 19,907 (1999).
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customers, 33 while "rate structures" are "rate elements. 3 4 The FCC
defined a "rate element" as a specified CMRS service that is subject to
charges.35 The FCC's use of one term of art, "rate element," to define
another term of art, "rate structure," helped the FCC use its prior decisions
to equate "line items" with "rates."
The FCC argued that its USF
Contribution Order36 equated "rate element" and "line items. 3 7 In one
sentence in a footnote of the order, the FCC stated that "incumbent local
exchange carriers are required to recover their federal universal service
contribution costs through a line item, which may be combined for billing
purposes with another rate element."38 The FCC also used similar
language in another universal service order.3 9
The FCC used this precedent to justify its decision to deny states
jurisdiction of line items in paragraph 31 of the 2005 TIB Declaratory
Ruling.4 ° The FCC argued that many of the state regulations the
Commission assesses prohibit a CMRS provider from recovering certain
costs via a line item. Such regulations force the wireless provider to recoup
costs in other parts of the bill. 4 1 These regulations affect the rate structure
and directly affect rates. 42 For example, Indiana Code § 6-2.3-2-1 charged
utilities a "Utility Receipts Tax." This was meant to be an income tax on
utilities for the cost of doing business in Indiana. This law did not prevent
utilities from recovering the costs associated with the tax, but it did prohibit
utilities from listing the costs associated with the tax as a separate line item
on customers' bills. Although restrictingproviders' labeling of charges
did not affect the amount that the CMRS carrier could collect, the FCC
43
ruled that this sort of regulation of line-item descriptions was preempted.
The FCC banned general state regulations of wireless bill line items in
the first sentence of 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling's paragraph 30.44 The
33. See Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. at 6462-63.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 FCC Rec. 24,952 (2002).
37. See Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. at 6463 n. 83 (quoting USF
ContributionOrder).
38. Id. (emphasis supplied by FCC).
39. See Access Charge Reform, 15 FCC Rec. 12,962, 13,057 (2000).
40 See Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. at 6463-64. This paragraph cited
Indiana Code § 6-2.3-2-1, Vt. Code § 7.615(C) (the declaratory ruling accidentally cites §
7.617(c)), and Ga. Code 46-5-167(h) as examples of preempted legislation.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 6462-63.
44. Id. ("We find that state regulations requiring or prohibiting the use of line itemsdefined here to mean a discrete charge identified separately on an end user's bill--constitute rate
regulation and, as such, are preempted under section 332(c)(3)(A) of the Act.").
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FCC immediately followed this preemption by stating what states may do
under the statute. In paragraph 33, the Commission explicitly stated that
"state regulations that address the disclosure of whatever rates the CMRS
provider chooses to set .
[are] not preempted by section 332." 45 This
statement seems to indicate that the FCC distinguished line-item charges
from descriptions. The FCC's statement, however, is ambiguous, given the
examples cited as preempted rate regulation under paragraph 31.
Because the 1993 Omnibus Act gave the FCC authority over "rates"
and gave states authority over "other terms and conditions," the FCC's
preemption of state regulation would not have been complete without
discussion of "other terms and conditions. 4 6 Accordingly, the FCC argued
that the phrase "other terms and conditions" allows states to maintain
control over areas typically within their regulatory authority. "Other terms
and conditions" apply to customer billing practices only insofar as they
encroach on traditional state regulatory authority.
Traditional state
regulatory authority, according to the FCC, concerns consumer protection
and contract laws 47 that do not conflict with the Truth-in-Billing rules.
Additionally, in paragraph 32 of the Ruling, the Commission stated that the
Ruling does not interfere with jurisdiction typically within states' power.
For example, states may continue to impose regulatory fees, taxes, and
contributions to state universal service programs. 48 The Commission
argued that this result was necessary due to its prior orders that interpreted
47 U.S.C. § 254(f) as allowing states to charge CMRS carriers for universal
service support.4 9 Nonetheless, allowing states to charge CMRS providers
fees and taxes would directly affect rates much more directly than allowing
states to tell CMRS carriers how to describe their charges. This conundrum
contributed to the Eleventh Circuit overturning the 2005 TIB Declaratory
Ruling.5"
C. Court Cases in Response
Currently, two courts in three cases have addressed the 2005 TIB
DeclaratoryRuling.51 The two courts have reached split decisions.

45. Id. at 6465. Unfortunately, the FCC did not provide an example of what it meant by
"disclosure of... rates."
46. Id. at 6463-64.
47. Id. at 6465-66
48. Id. at 6464-65.
49. See id.
50. See infra Part II.C.1.
51. A third court in Cellco P'ship v. Hatch, 431 F.3d 1077, 1080 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005), cites
the ruling, but ultimately reaches its decision on other grounds.
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The Eleventh Circuit'sNASUCA v. FCC52

After the FCC issued its 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling, NASUCA
immediately challenged it. While the FCC argued that the Ruling did no
more than regulate rates, NASUCA contended that the Ruling exceeded the
FCC's statutory authority by ultimately regulating "other terms and
conditions," which the 1993 Omnibus Act left under the states'
jurisdiction.53 The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the 2005 TIB
DeclaratoryRuling.54
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit first discussed general
principles of constitutional law and then analyzed the statute. 55 The court's
analysis began with the assumption that police powers are reserved to the
56
states "unless preemption is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.,
According to the court, this "presumption against preemption ' 57 helps
guide courts' statutory interpretation under Chevron.58
59
The court proceeded by discussing the demands of Chevron.
Chevron requires that courts analyze commission regulations through a
two-part test. First, a court must consider "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue., 60
If Congress' intent is
unambiguous, agencies and courts must defer to it. 61 Courts determine
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue by
interpreting the statute's language and by applying traditional canons of
statutory interpretation.6 2 The second step of Chevron is triggered "if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue."63 If
congressional intent is not clear from the statute, then the court must
determine whether an agency's actions constitute a "permissible
construction of the statute. 64 A court must defer to an agency's
interpretation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to

52. See Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1238 (11 th Cir.
2006).
53. Id. at 1241.
54. See id. at 1258.
55. See id. at 1252-58.
56. Id. at 1254 (quoting Cliffv. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc. 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (lith
Cir. 2004)).
57. Id. at 1252.
58. See id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
837-38 (1984).
59. Id. at 1253 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
60. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (emphasis added by Eleventh Circuit).
64. Id.
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the statute. 65 The Supreme Court of the United States has written that
"unexplained inconsistency is ...a reason for holding an interpretation to
66
be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice.
In NASUCA v. FCC, the Eleventh Circuit held that the statute was
unambiguous under Chevron's first step.67 According to the court,
Congress did not elaborate on the definition of "rates charged" because its
meaning was clear.68 As evidence, the court provided three definitions of
rates from three different types of dictionaries: English, Legal, and
American. 69 All of these dictionaries essentially define a "rate" as an
amount charged for a commodity.7 °
The court reasoned that a line item was not an amount charged for a
commodity but was merely a description.7 ' By force of this reason, line
items are not rates, and states may regulate line items.7 Specifically, the
court stated, "[t]he prohibition or requirement of a line item affects the
presentation of the charge on the user's bill, but it does not affect the
amount that a user is charged for service. 73 Moreover, the court argued
that states have the power to regulate CMRS line items because (1) the
presumption is that states have the authority to regulate absent an explicit
declaration from Congress 74 and (2) the 1993 Omnibus Act expressly
reserves the power to regulate "other terms and conditions" to the states.75
The court also argued that defining "line item" as a rate actually
The Eleventh Circuit argued that the
defied the FCC's precedent.
A
ta addressed the definition of "rates"
that
Southwestern Bell Order,76 an order
under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), defined a rate as "an amount of payment
or charge based on some other amount., 77 This definition is similar to the
plain language definition given by the court.78 The court argued that,
65.
66.

Id.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967,

981 (2005)).
67. Id. at 1254.
68. Id.
69. Id. Specifically, the court stated, "A 'rate,' as defined by the Oxford English
Dictionary, is '[t]he amount of a charge or payment... having relation to some other amount or
basis of calculation.' Other dictionaries define a 'rate' as '[a]n amount paid or charged for a good
or service,' or 'a charge per unit of a public-service commodity."' Id. (citations omitted).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 59-62.
75. See Nat'lAss'n of State Util. ConsumerAdvocates, 457 F.3d 1238 (1 th Cir. 2006).
76. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rec. 19,898 (1999).
77. Nat'lAss'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates, 457 F.3d at 1254.
78. See id.
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despite the FCC's labeling line items as "rate structures," these items "do
not require a carrier to recover nor prohibit a carrier from recovering a
particular cost."7 9 Rather, state regulations affecting line items "pertain
only to the presentation of that cost on customer bills.

' 80

In other words, a

line item, from the perspective of the Eleventh Circuit, is a line-item
description: it merely describes what the wireless carrier is already
charging. This description does nothing to prevent or require actual
charges.
The Eleventh Circuit continued that the FCC inadequately explained
how line items directly affect rates. 8' The court was confused by the FCC's
position, because the FCC had previously found that the "universal service
contribution requirement is not, within the plain meaning of the statute, a
rate or entry regulation," despite such a requirement's direct impact on
rates. 82 From the court's perspective, line-item descriptions seemed to be a

less direct effect on "rates" than allowing states to impose universal service
fees on wireless carriers. 83 Moreover, the court stated that including terms
like "rate levels" and "rate structures" within the general term of "rates"
of "rates" and "magically expand the
does not change the meaning
84
authority of the Commission."
2.

The Western District of Washington Assesses Washington Code § 82.04.500

A few months after the Eleventh Circuit declared that the 2005 TIB
Declaratory Ruling exceeded the FCC's authority under 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(3)(A), the Western District of Washington twice upheld the 2005
TIB Declaratory Ruling in Peck v. Cingular Wireless85 and Hesse v.

Sprint.86 Both cases dealt with the same issues and reached the same
conclusions on similar reasoning. The issues were (1) whether the 2005
TIB DeclaratoryRuling was valid under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) 8 7 and, if
so, (2) whether § 82.04.500 of the Washington Code88 violated the 2005

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1256.

84. Id. at 1255-56.
85. Peck v. Cingular Wireless, No. C06-343Z-TSZ (W.D. Wash. Oct. 24, 2006).
86. Hesse v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. C06-0592-JCC, 2007 WL 172614 (W.D. Wash. Jan.
18, 2007).
87. Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 3-5; Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *1.
88. See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.500 (2006).
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TIB Declaratory
Ruling.89 Both cases answered both issues in the
90
affirmative.
Section 82.04.500 of the Washington Code assessed a tax on
businesses for the privilege of doing business in Washington and indicated
how the tax was to be described on customers' bills. 91 The Code stated,
It is not the intention of this chapter that the taxes herein levied upon
persons engaging in business be construed as taxes upon the purchasers
or customers, but that such taxes shall be levied upon, and collectible
from, the person engaging in the business activities herein designated
and that such92taxes shall constitute a part of the operating overhead of
such persons.
While § 82.04.500 prohibited businesses from recouping a Business and
Occupation tax ("B&O tax") under that name as a separate line item, the
statute allowed the business to recoup the costs of the tax from customers
if
93
overhead.
general
its
of
part
as
tax
the
included
merely
the business
a.

Peck v. Cingular Wireless

The court in Peck held that the 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling did not
exceed its statutory directive when it preempted line-item regulation as rate
regulation.94 The Western District Court analyzed the 1993 Omnibus Act
using the Chevron test.95 The court noted that when
a statute is ambiguous,
96
the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference.
Under the first step of Chevron, the court found that Congress' use of
"rate" was ambiguous. The Western District Court cited two definitions of
the word and then interpreted them. The court first cited the Oxford
English Dictionary, which defined a rate as "an amount of a charge or
payment . .

.

having relation to some other amount or basis of

calculation., 97 The court next cited Black's Law Dictionary,which defined
rate as "an amount paid or charged for a good or service. 98 The court then
recapped the Eleventh Circuit's argument:
The NASUCA court held that "[s]tate regulations of line items regulate
the billing practices of cellular wireless providers, not the charges that
89.
90.

Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 3-5; Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *1.
Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 5; Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *4.

91.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.500.

92. Id.
93. See Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at * 1.
94. Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 5.
95. Id. at 3-5.
96. Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 3-4 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
97. Id. at 4 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)).
98. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
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are imposed on the consumer. The Eleventh Circuit held that because
for
the presentation of line items on a bill is not a 'charge or payment'
99
service, it is an 'other term or condition' regulable by the states."
The Peck court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's analysis. The court argued
that line items are charges: "a line item is one of the charges a wireless
customer pays in order to receive service. An ambiguity exists because
'rate' could mean only the carrier's base rate, or it could refer to the total
The court then added,
amount a customer pays for service. ' ' °
"[n]evertheless, because the collection of the tax directly affects the rate
Cingular charges, Mr. Peck's claims are preempted by [the 1993 Omnibus
Act]. 101
b.

Hesse v. Sprint

A year later the Western District of Washington maintained the Peck
holding in Hesse v. Sprint. The Hesse court, however, also acknowledged
the special nature of § 82.04.500. The court reasoned that preventing
companies from charging a particular line item does not stop companies
02
from recouping the costs as part of their general overhead.1
Consequently, the regulation only prevents companies from naming the
charge a "B&O tax," making § 82.04.500 a line-item regulation. 103
After the court assessed the statute as a line-item regulation, it turned
to the issue of whether federal law preempted line-item regulations. The
court held that federal regulations preempt the Washington Code's ability
04
The court stated that its holding
to regulate the B&O tax as a line-item.
05
Chevron.'
by
demanded
was the result
In assessing § 332 under the first step of Chevron, the court first
declared that the language of the federal statute was ambiguous as to
whether "rates" included line items. 0 6 The court stated that the statute
never defined the terms "rates" or "other terms and conditions of wireless
services."'0 7 The court then noted that the D.C. Circuit also acknowledged

99. Id. (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1238,
1254 (11 th Cir. 2006) (emphasis supplied by the Peck court)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
102. Hesse v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. C06-0592-JCC, 2007 WL 172614, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2007).
103. Id.
104. Id. at *3.
105. See id. at *2-3.

106. Id. at *2.
107.

Id. at*1.
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that the legislative history does not elaborate on these terms.10 8 Finally, the
court cited the definition of "rate" from Black's Law Dictionary: "an
amount paid or charged for a good or service."' 0 9 Citing the reasoning in
Peck, the Hesse court argued that this definition could "refer either to the
base rate of the carrier or to the overall amount a customer pays for
service."''10
Because the court determined that the statute was ambiguous, it
moved on to the second step of Chevron."' The court found that the
FCC's interpretation of "rates" was reasonable and, therefore, that it was
obligated to defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute.' 12 The court
argued that the FCC employed one of the two definitions of "rates" that
was reasonable under the statute, but the court did not state which
definition of rate-"base rate" or "overall amount charged"-the FCC
employed. 1 3 The court quoted a portion of the 2005 TIB Declaratory
Ruling that stated, "[s]tate regulations that prohibit a CMRS carrier from
recovering certain costs through a separate line item, thereby permitting
cost recovery only through an undifferentiated charge for service, clearly
and directly affect the manner in which the CMRS carrier structures its
rates."' 114 Although it did not explicitly say so, the court seemed to argue
that the FCC was protecting wireless providers' base calling plan rates. 115
If fifty states each had fifty different taxes that required inclusion in the
wireless providers' base rates, then wireless providers could not advertise
base calling plans at a particular rate for regions that cross state lines. The
FCC interpretation allows wireless carriers to create national and regional
wireless calling plans without subjecting the carriers to a varying
patchwork of rate restructuring to meet each state's demands."l 6 According
to the court, the FCC's interpretation of "rate" suits the boundary-less
nature of wireless. The court added that this is why 7wireless rates were
placed under FCC authority in the 1993 Omnibus Act. 1
In summary, the court held that the 1993 Omnibus Act was ambiguous
as to the meaning of "rate," and that the FCC's interpretation of the term in
108
1999)).
109.
110.
Oct. 24,
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. (citing Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at *2 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
Id. (citing Peck v. Cingular Wireless, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash.
2006)).
Id.
Id. at *2-3.
Id.at *2.
Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6448, 6463-64 (2005).
See Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *2.
See id.
See supra note 7.
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its 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling was a plausible interpretation of the
statute. 1 8 Thus, the FCC's interpretation was entitled to deference under
Chevron, and the court held that the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling
preempted Washington Code § 82.04.500.119 The court reached this
holding despite its awareness that the Eleventh0 Circuit had previously
reached a different conclusion on the same issue.12
III. Assessing the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling
under Chevron and 5 U.S.C. § 706
The rule set forth by the FCC-states may neither require nor prohibit
line items 12 '-could be declared invalid by a court for two possible
reasons. First, a court could find that the Ruling violates the first step of
Chevron, because the statutory term is unambiguous and the agency acted
outside its statutory scope of authority. All of the courts that have
previously addressed the 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling have defined "rates"
unambiguously and contrary to the definition used by the Ruling. Second,
assuming that the statutory term is ambiguous and gets past the first step of
Chevron, a court could find the FCC's regulation of line-item descriptions
is arbitrary and capricious: Washington Code § 82.04.500 and similar
regulations are taxes, and the FCC's Ruling both explicitly exempts such
regulation while at the same time explicitly preempts the regulation.
A.

Chevron

Regardless of whether the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling is arbitrary
and capricious, the Ruling, given the subsequent court decisions, could be
remanded by courts for violating the first step of Chevron. Under Chevron,
if a commission's definition violates the plain meaning of the statute, then
it should be vacated.122 The definition of "rates" is unambiguous. Both
courts that have dealt with the 2005 TIB Declaratory
Ruling have defined
"rates charged" as an amount charged or paid. 123

118. Hesse, 2007WL 172614, at *2.
119. Seeid.at*3.
120. Id. at *2 ("This Court recognizes that the Eleventh Circuit came to a different
conclusion, and respectfully disagrees with its opinion.").
121. Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6448, 6462-63 (2005).
122. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 n.6 (1997) (dismissing an agency
interpretation that countered the plain meaning of a statute).
123. See Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1238, 1254 (11 th
Cir. 2006); Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *2; Peck v. Cingular Wireless, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip
op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 24, 2006); see also Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC
Rec. 19,898 (1999) (defining "rates" as an amount of a payment or charge).
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The Western District court's inference that a rate is a "base rate" or
"the overall amount charged" is derived from dictionary definitions that
describe a rate as an amount charged or paid.124 The pertinent question for
a preemption analysis of a state statute should be whether the state
regulation, aside from its nature as a tax, 2 5 affects the amount charged or
paid by the consumer." Based on all of the definitions cited by both courts,
the charge is taken to mean the overall amount of the bill. If customers
claimed to pay their cell phone bill by only paying the base rate, the cell
phone provider would say that the customers did not pay the amount that
they were being charged. Regulations that attempt to control rates attempt
to reduce (or add to) the amount paid by or charged to the consumer.
Regulations of mere descriptions do not affect rates because they do not
affect the amount that the customer is charged or the amount the customer
pays any more than any other terms and conditions, nor would regulations
of descriptions affect the amount that the carrier charges or is paid. If a
state regulation does not clearly and directly affect the amount paid by or
charged to customers, then a plain reading of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), as
confirmed by all cited dictionaries, demands a finding that such a
regulation is not rate regulation.
The argument that a "base rate" is merely a line item description was
explained by NASUCA. NASUCA argued that wireless and wireline
providers were lowering the cost of their base rates of service and creating
a differentiated charge labeled "state taxes" to recoup general overhead
costs. If the service providers were required to re-label these taxes as part
of their base rate, then the service provider would still be charging the same
amount, just labeling the line items differently. Therefore, these line items
are mere descriptions because they do not affect what is ultimately charged
the customer. If rates are charges for a commodity, then because the
amount charged to the customer is unaffected, state regulations affecting
the description of the base rate should be considered outside the scope of
the FCC's authority under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A).
Moreover, regulations of descriptions on bills are "other terms and
conditions." In its Southwestern Bell Order, the FCC cited a House report
that stated, "[by] 'terms and conditions,' the Committee intends to include
such matters as customer billing information and practices and billing
protection
consumer
other
and
disputes

124. See Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 4; Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *2. The
dictionaries and definitions were almost identical to the Eleventh Circuit's. Compare supra notes
69 and 97-98.
125. See Trth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6463-64.
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matters .... 126 The House report cited by the FCC in the Southwestern
Bell Order places consumer protection billing practices squarely within the
authority of the states. The FCC arguably acknowledged that descriptions
are "other terms and conditions" when it exempted regulations that merely
12 7
describe what the carrier charges in paragraph 33 of the Ruling.
Allowing states to prohibit or require "disclosure of whatever rates the
CMRS provider chooses to set" would have a state-by-state cost that would
have an impact that seems quite similar to the FCC's justification to
preempt line-item descriptions.
B.

5 U.S.C. § 706

The 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling set forth by the FCC could be
remanded by a court for being arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. §
706 because it is over-inclusive in its reasoning. If an agency does not
make a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,"
then the court must vacate the agency decision for being based on arbitrary
and capricious reasoning.12 8 When a court determines whether an agency
made a rational connection between its facts and reasoning, it assesses
"relevant issues, consistency with past practice, [and] avoidance of
unexplained discrimination."' 129 A court need not dismiss more of the order
than is necessary to align the rule with the reasoning of the agency., 30 The
reviewing court, however, may not supply new justifications for the agency
action that were not asserted by the agency.' 3' The FCC's rule preempting
states from prohibiting or requiring any line items could be remanded for
being arbitrary and capricious, because the FCC does not adequately justify
why it prohibits states from regulating line-item descriptions.
First, the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling could be seen as internally
inconsistent. In its paragraph 31, the FCC cites examples of state
regulations that are preempted for affecting rates.1 32 However, those

126. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rec. 19,898, 19,901-02 (1999)
(emphasis added).
127. Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6464-65.
128. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
129. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993).
130. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. McLucas, 381 F. Supp. 657, 661-62 (D.C.N.J. 1974)
(stating that the phrase "set aside agency action," within a provision of Administrative Procedure
Act that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action not in accordance with
the law, "does not require a setting aside of an entire agency decision when legal deficiencies of
decision are readily curable .... ); see also New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v.
FCC, 669 F.2d 58, 63 (2nd Cir. 1982).
131. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
132. Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. 6448, 6463-64 (2005).

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[30:287

regulations are actually generally applicable taxes. In paragraph 32, the
of traditional state regulatory authority, explicitly
Ruling exempts areas
33
1
taxes.
exempting
Moreover, those preempted state tax regulations that are also line-item
descriptions also seem to be capriciously preempted. In paragraph 31, the
FCC's examples of regulations that were banned by its Ruling, aside from
being taxes, were regulations of line-item descriptions. 134 However, in
paragraph 33, the FCC claimed that "state regulations that address
disclosure of whatever rates the CMRS provider chooses to set ... are not
preempted by section 332." 135 The exemption in paragraph 33 suggests
that descriptions were not meant to be affected by "rates." Yet, the state
regulations banned by the Ruling merely address how a tax may not be
disclosed as a separate line item.
The Western District is correct in arguing that the FCC may regulate
line-item charges that affect the amount charged or paid by consumers.
However, the problem with the Western District court rulings and
paragraph 31 of the 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling is that, insofar as they
affect 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A), the rulings fail to address state regulations
of a mixed nature. For example, Washington Code § 82.04.500 and similar
regulations are both a regulation of a line-item description and of a tax. A
literal application of the two Western District Court rulings and paragraph
31 of the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling could effectively prevent states
from taxing CMRS carriers.' 36 The line-item aspect of the B&O tax does
not directly affect rates, but because the actual B&O tax does, it is a tax.
Even if § 82.04.500 allowed CMRS carriers to recoup the B&O tax in a
separate line item, it would, like any state tax, ultimately affect the "base
137
rate of the carrier or overall amount a customer pays for service.''
Section 82.04.500 affects the amount charged to consumers because it adds
to the carrier's cost, regardless of whether it is labeled as overhead or as a
tax. The B&O tax also affects the overall amount a customer pays because
the carrier will recoup this cost from the customer, no matter how it is
labeled on the bill.
Section 82.04.500 should be exempted from the 2005 TIB Declaratory
Ruling because the aspect of the statute that affects rates is a tax and not a

133. Id. at 6464-65.
134 Id. at 6464 n.87.
135 Id. at 6464-65.
136. See, e.g., Peck v. Cingular Wireless, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 24, 2006).
137. Hesse v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. C06-0592-JCC, 2007 WL 172614, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2007).
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line-item description.

The FCC stated in paragraph 32 of the 2005 TIB

DeclaratoryRuling that:

[w]hile we hold that state regulation prohibiting or requiring CMRS line
items constitutes preempted rate regulation, we emphasize that this
preemption does not affect other areas within the states' regulatory
authority. For example, our ruling does nothing to disturb the states'

ability to require CMRS carriers to contribute to state universal13service
8
support mechanisms or to impose other regulatory fees and taxes.
Because state taxes are exempted from the 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling,
something in the nature of describing the tax differently had to "affect
rates"-as defined by the court t 9-in
order for § 82.04.500 to be
preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). In other words, in order to be
within the FCC's authority, the state prohibition on labeling the tax on
consumers' bills had to affect the actual amount charged by the wireless
provider. Otherwise, the labeling would not affect the "rates" of the
wireless provider because it would not affect the ultimate charge, and thus
preemption of labeling regulation would be outside of the FCC's
jurisdiction.
Aside from its nature as a tax on businesses generally, Section
82.04.500 is also a regulation of line-item descriptions. In disagreeing with
the Eleventh Circuit, the Western District Court of Washington argued:
Here, for example, the state prohibits businesses from charging its
customers for a B & 0 tax, and thus in some sense prohibits the specific
charges or "rates" that these businesses can assess. At the same time, the
statute allows the economic burden of the tax to be passed onto
customers in the form of higher overall service fees to recoup overhead,
and thus in another sense the prohibition does not alter the overall

charges or "rates" businesses may require of their customers. Thus,
regardless of which interpretation of the word "rates" is4preferable, there
certainly is ambiguity in the statute's usage of the term.
The court, through this reasoning, acknowledged that the tax affected rates,
but the relabeling did not alter the amount charged. The district court
confounded the tax function of § 82.04.500 with the section's relabeling
function. Because the court confounded these functions, it believed that
whether line items constitute a "rate" was ambiguous. According to the
court, because carriers cannot collect the B&O tax under that B&O tax

138. Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. at 6464-65 (emphasis added).
139. Hesse, 2007 WL 172614, at *2 (citing Peck, No. C06-343Z-TSZ, slip op. at 4).
140. Id. at *2 (emphasis added). While the court concludes that "ambiguity in the statute's
usage" of "rates" exists, that is not what the court was actually arguing. The court was discussing
the dichotomous nature of the § 82.04.500's impact on rates. On one hand, the statute did affect
rates, because it was a tax. On the other hand, the statute did not affect rates because it merely
regulated line-item descriptions.
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label, it may or may not be affecting rates. This uncertainty stems from the
ambiguous definition of rates. According to Hesse, however, the plain
of
language
§ 82.04.500 (except for its nature as a general business tax) does not affect
the amount customers are charged or pay, but merely prohibits a line-item
description of the tax. Consequently, while paragraph 31 of the 2005 TIB
Declaratory
Ruling
asserts
that
statutes
like
§ 82.04.500 are preempted for directly affecting rates, 141 the line-item
nature of the statute does not affect rates and should be considered outside
the scope of the FCC's statutory authority.142
Insofar as
§ 82.04.500 is a tax, it should not be preempted by the Ruling lest all state
taxes of wireless carriers be preempted.
This would give
the FCC too much power under the federal statute while
directly contradicting the Ruling's exemption for state taxes in paragraph
32.143

The FCC, instead of explaining the inconsistencies among the
regulations that it bans and exempts from preemption, declines to directly
address and clarify them. In paragraph 34, the FCC acknowledges that the
rule it set may not be clear:
Because "[w]e recognize that the line between prohibited and
permissible" state regulations of line items "may not always be clear,"
we issue a Second Further Notice seeking comment on how further to
define the scope of section 332(c)(3)(A)'s preemption, as well as in
general on where to draw the line between the Commission's jurisdiction
and states'44 jurisdiction over wireless and wireline carriers' billing
practices.1

The FCC thus indicated that its justification for the distinction between the
two types of line-item descriptions for which state regulation is or is not
preempted may come in a future order, if at all.
Second, the FCC does not justify how preempting regulations like the
Indiana Code affects how a CMRS carrier is precluded from charging for
its services. In paragraph 30, the FCC defines rate regulation under Section
332(c)(3)(A) as "prohibit[ing] states from prescribing 'how much may be
charged' for CMRS, [and] also prohibit[ing] states from prescribing 'the
141. Truth-In-Billing and Billing Format, 20 FCC Rec. at 6463-64 (citing, inter alia, an
Indiana statute that the Commission argued was preempted. This statute is very similar to
Washington Code § 82.04.500).
142. See infra Part III.B.
143. Id. at 6464-65. ("[W]e emphasize that this preemption does not affect other areas within
the states' regulatory authority. For example, our ruling does nothing to disturb the states' ability
to require CMRS carriers to contribute to state universal service support mechanisms or to impose
other regulatory fees and taxes.").
144. Id. at 6465-66 (citation omitted).
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rate elements for CMRS' or 'specify[ing] which among the CMRS services
provided can be subject to charges by CMRS providers.""0 45 Since the
Indiana Code is a tax on businesses, and therefore exempt under paragraph
32 of the Ruling, and is also a regulation of a line-item description for how
that tax may be recouped by the carrier, the Indiana Code § 6-2.3-2-1 does
not dictate what CMRS services may subject to charges by the carrier.
Indiana Code § 6-2.3-2-1 tells carriers how they may not recoup a tax. It
does not affect how a CMRS provider may recoup a service the carrier
provides its customers.
Third, the FCC breaks from its own precedent. In the Southwestern
Bell
Order, the
FCC
defined
"rates"
for
47
U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(3)(A) as "an amount of payment or charge based on some other
amount."' 146 After the FCC took this definition from the dictionary, the
FCC then went on to explain how "rate elements" and "rate structures"
affect rates/amounts. However, the FCC did not reiterate the dictionary
definition in the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling. The Southwestern Bell
Order definition of "rates" as an amount charged or paid would seem to
preclude preemption of state line-item description regulations since
descriptions are not amounts, but rather, charges are not amounts.
IV. Response to FCC's Use of Precedent
The FCC would likely claim that the specific issue is whether a lineitem is a rate. Accordingly, the FCC focused its defining of "rates" on how
it has historically defined rates when "line items" have been at issue. Three
arguments exist that counter this claim.
First, the FCC defined "rates" as an "amount" in its Southwestern Bell
Order. In that order, the FCC also defined "rate elements" and "rate
structures" as comprising this amount. Second, the FCC's most cited
precedent in the Ruling, the Federal-State Joint Board Order and USF
Contribution Order, may not be an appropriate source. The Eleventh
Circuit considered the USF Contribution Order147 but dismissed it as
inapplicable because it equated "rates" with line-item charges, not line-item
descriptions.1 48 The Eleventh Circuit also argued that the statutory basis
for the USF Contribution Order was different from the statute at issue in
the 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling. Consequently, citing to the USF
145. Id. at 6462-63.
146 Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 457 F.3d 1238, 1254 (11 th Cir.
2006) (quoting Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 14 FCC Rec. 19,898, 19,907 (1999)).
147. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 FCC Rec. 24,952 (2002).
148. Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates, 457 F.3d at 1257 ("[T]he Commission
did not equate the imposition of the universal service contribution with the presentation of the
universal service contribution on the bill.").
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Contribution Order was inapposite to the present issue. 149 Both of these
50
arguments are equally applicable to the Federal-StateJoint Board Order.1
Moreover, the FCC was not careful with its language regarding "rate
elements" and "line items" in the USF Contribution Order. For instance,
while the FCC may have equated line items with rate elements in a
footnote, the Commission seemed to distinguish "rates" from "line items"
in the paragraph that the footnote referenced. Paragraph 53 of the USF
Contribution Order states, "[c]arriers will continue to have flexibility to
recover their contribution costs through their rates or through a line
item." 5' This sentence from the USF Contribution Order seems to make
"rates" and "line items" mutually exclusive. While making these terms
mutually exclusive may not have been the Commission's intent, the
sentence is evidence that citing to the USF Contribution Order may be of
little value when defining the "line items" and "rates."
The USF
Contribution Order did not carefully distinguish its use of the terms "line
items," "rates," and "rate elements" because the technical definitions of
these words were not at issue in that order. Rather, the section of the order
at issue focused on ensuring that carriers may recoup contribution losses by
imposing charges on consumers.
Finally, even if the FCC's precedent does establish that all line items
are rates, the FCC may not define "rates" beyond its plain statutory
meaning, which has been established by both federal courts as an
"4amount."
V. Conclusion
The 2005 TIB Declaratory Ruling justifies preempting state
regulations that prohibit or require line-item charges, but inadequately
justifies preempting regulations of line-item descriptions. Among these
preempted line-item descriptions are the explicitly preempted regulations
discussed in paragraph 31. These regulations, like Washington Code §
82.04.500 or Indiana Code § 6-2.3-2-1, are generally applicable taxes,
which are explicitly exempted from the Ruling in paragraph 32. Inasmuch
as the state codes address how a tax should be disclosed on a customer's
bill, these regulations should be exempted in paragraph 33 of the Ruling as
well. Moreover, regulations of line-item descriptions seemingly go beyond
the dictionary definitions of "rates" offered by both courts that have dealt
with the 2005 TIB DeclaratoryRuling. The Ruling consequently could be

149. See id. at 1256.
150. See Access Charge Reform, 15 FCC Rec. 12,962, 13,057 (2000).
151. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 FCC Rec. at 24,979 (emphasis
added).
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curtailed for violating a plain reading of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) under the
first step of Chevron. Ultimately, the rule that may remain from the 2005
TIB Declaratory Ruling is that line charges are preempted, but line-item
descriptions are not.
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